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Human beings can be proactive and engaged or,  alterna- 
tively,  passive and alienated,  largely as a function  of the 
social conditions in which they develop and function. Ac- 
cordingly,  research  guided  by  self-determination  theo~ 
has focused on the social-contextual conditions that facil- 
itate versus forestall the natural processes  of self-motiva- 
tion and healthy psychological development.  Specifically, 
factors have been examined that enhance versus undermine 
intrinsic motivation,  self-regulation,  and well-being.  The 
findings  have led to the postulate of three  innate psycho- 
logical needs--competence,  autonomy,  and relatedness-- 
which  when  satisfied yield  enhanced self-motivation  and 
mental health and when thwarted lead to diminished mo- 
tivation and well-being. Also considered is the significance 
of these psychological needs and processes within domains 
such as health care,  education,  work,  sport,  religion,  and 
psychotherapy. 
T 
he fullest representations of humanity show people 
to be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best, 
they are agentic and inspired,  striving to learn;  ex- 
tend themselves; master new skills; and apply their talents 
responsibly.  That  most people  show  considerable  effort, 
agency, and commitment in their lives appears, in fact, to 
be more normative than exceptional, suggesting some very 
positive and persistent features of human nature. 
Yet,  it  is  also  clear  that  the  human  spirit  can  be 
diminished  or crushed and that individuals  sometimes re- 
ject growth and responsibility. Regardless of social strata 
or  cultural  origin,  examples  of both  children  and  adults 
who  are  apathetic,  alienated,  and  irresponsible  are  abun- 
dant. Such non-optimal human functioning can be observed 
not only in  our psychological clinics but also  among the 
millions  who,  for hours  a  day,  sit passively before their 
televisions, stare blankly from the back of their classrooms, 
or wait listlessly  for the  weekend  as  they  go about their 
jobs. The persistent, proactive, and positive tendencies of 
human nature are clearly not invariantly apparent. 
The fact that human nature, phenotypically expressed, 
can  be either  active or passive,  constructive  or indolent, 
suggests more than mere dispositional differences and is a 
function of more than just biological endowments.  It also 
bespeaks a wide range of reactions to social environments 
that is worthy of our most intense scientific investigation. 
Specifically, social contexts catalyze both within- and be- 
tween-person  differences  in  motivation  and  personal 
growth,  resulting  in  people  being  more  self-motivated, 
energized, and integrated in some situations, domains, and 
cultures  than  in  others.  Research  on  the  conditions  that 
foster versus undermine positive human potentials has both 
theoretical import and practical significance because it can 
contribute not only to formal knowledge of the causes of 
human behavior but also to the design of social environ- 
ments  that  optimize people's development,  performance, 
and well-being. Research guided by self-determination the- 
ory (SDT) has had an ongoing concern with precisely these 
issues (Deci & Ryan,  1985,  1991;  Ryan,  1995). 
Self-Determination Theory 
SDT is an approach to human motivation and personality 
that uses traditional empirical methods while employing an 
organismic  metatheory that  highlights  the  importance  of 
humans'  evolved inner resources for personality develop- 
ment and behavioral self-regulation (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 
1997).  Thus,  its  arena  is  the  investigation  of  people's 
inherent growth tendencies and innate psychological needs 
that are the basis for their self-motivation and personality 
integration,  as well as for the conditions that foster those 
positive  processes.  Inductively,  using  the  empirical  pro- 
cess,  we have identified  three  such  needs--the needs  for 
competence  (Harter,  1978;  White,  1963),  relatedness 
(Baumeister  &  Leary,  1995;  Reis,  1994),  and  autonomy 
(deCharms,  1968;  Deci,  1975)--that appear to be essential 
for facilitating optimal functioning  of the natural propen- 
sities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive 
social development and personal well-being. 
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Much of the research guided by SDT has also exam- 
ined environmental factors that hinder or undermine  self- 
motivation,  social  functioning,  and  personal  well-being. 
Although many specific deleterious  effects have been ex- 
plored, the research suggests that these detriments can be 
most parsimoniously described  in  terms  of thwarting  the 
three basic psychological needs.  Thus,  SDT is  concerned 
not only with the specific nature of positive developmental 
tendencies,  but it  also examines  social environments that 
are antagonistic toward these tendencies. 
The  empirical  methods  used  in  much  of  the  SDT 
research have been in the Baconian tradition, in that social 
contextual  variables  have  been  directly  manipulated  to 
examine their effects on both internal processes and behav- 
ioral  manifestations.  The  use  of experimental  paradigms 
has allowed us to specify the conditions under which peo- 
ple's natural activity and constructiveness will flourish,  as 
well  as  those that promote a  lack of self-motivation and 
social integration. In this  way, we have used experimental 
methods  without  accepting  the  mechanistic  or  efficient 
causal  meta-theories  that  have  typically  been  associated 
with those methods. 
In this  article  we  review  work guided by SDT,  ad- 
dressing its implications for three important outcomes. We 
begin  with  an  examination  of  intrinsic  motivation,  the 
prototypic  manifestation  of the  human  tendency  toward 
learning and creativity, and we consider research specify- 
ing  conditions  that  facilitate  versus  forestall  this  special 
type  of  motivation.  Second,  we  present  an  analysis  of 
self-regulation, which concerns how people take in social 
values and extrinsic contingencies and progressively trans- 
form  them  into  personal  values  and  self-motivations.  In 
that discussion, we outline different forms of internalized 
motivation,  addressing  their  behavioral  and  experiential 
correlates  and  the  conditions  that  ale  likely  to  promote 
these different motivations. Third, we focus on studies that 
have directly examined the impact of psychological need 
fulfillment on health and well-being. 
The Nature of Motivation 
Motivation  concerns  energy,  direction,  persistence  and 
equifinality--all aspects of activation and intention. Moti- 
vation has been a central and perennial issue in the field of 
psychology, for it is at the core of biological, cognitive, and 
social  regulation.  Perhaps  more  important,  in  the  real 
world,  motivation  is  highly valued because  of its  conse- 
quences: Motivation produces. It is therefore of preeminent 
concern to those  in  roles  such  as  manager,  teacher,  reli- 
gious leader,  coach, health  care provider,  and parent that 
involve mobilizing others to act. 
Although  motivation  is  often  treated  as  a  singular 
construct, even  superficial  reflection suggests that people 
are  moved to act by very different types of factors,  with 
highly varied experiences and consequences. People can be 
motivated because they value an activity or because there is 
strong external coercion. They can be urged into action by 
an abiding interest or by a bribe.  They can behave from a 
sense  of personal  commitment to  excel  or  from  fear  of 
being surveilled.  These contrasts between cases of having 
internal  motivation  versus  being  externally  pressured  are 
surely familiar to everyone. The issue of whether people 
stand behind a behavior out of their interests and values, or 
do it for reasons external to the self,  is  a matter of signif- 
icance in every culture (e.g., Johnson, 1993) and represents 
a basic dimension by which people make sense of their own 
and others' behavior (deCharms, 1968; Heider,  1958; Ryan 
& Connell,  1989). 
Comparisons between people whose motivation is au- 
thentic (literally,  self-authored or endorsed) and those who 
are  merely  externally  controlled  for  an  action  typically 
reveal  that  the  former,  relative  to  the  latter,  have  more 
interest,  excitement, and confidence, which in turn is man- 
ifest both as  enhanced performance, persistence,  and cre- 
ativity (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & 
Ilardi,  1997) and as heightened vitality (Nix, Ryan, Manly, 
&  Deci,  1999),  self-esteem  (Deci  &  Ryan,  1995),  and 
general well-being (Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995). This is 
so even when the people have the same level of perceived 
competence or self-efficacy for the activity. 
Because of the functional and experiential differences 
between  self-motivation and  external  regulation,  a  major 
focus  of SDT  has  been  to  supply  a  more  differentiated 
approach to motivation, by asking what kind of motivation 
is  being  exhibited  at  any given time.  By considering the 
perceived forces that move a person to act,  SDT has been 
able to identify several distinct types of motivation, each of 
which has  specifiable  consequences for learning,  perfor- 
mance, personal experience,  and well-being. Also, by ar- 
ticulating a set of principles concerning how each type of 
motivation is  developed and  sustained,  or forestalled  and 
undermined,  SDT  at  once recognizes a  positive thrust  to 
human nature and provides an account of passivity, alien- 
ation,  and psychopathology. 
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Intrinsic Motivation 
Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive poten- 
tial of human nature  as much as  intrinsic  motivation, the 
inherent  tendency  to  seek out  novelty and  challenges,  to 
extend  and  exercise  one's  capacities,  to  explore,  and  to 
learn.  Developmentalists acknowledge that from the  time 
of  birth,  children,  in  their  healthiest  states,  are  active, 
inquisitive,  curious,  and  playful,  even  in  the  absence  of 
specific rewards (e.g.,  Harter,  1978).  The construct of in- 
trinsic motivation describes this natural inclination toward 
assimilation,  mastery,  spontaneous  interest,  and  explora- 
tion that is so essential to cognitive and social development 
and  that  represents  a  principal  source  of enjoyment  and 
vitality  throughout  life  (Csikszentmihalyi  &  Rathunde, 
1993;  Ryan,  1995). 
Yet,  despite  the  fact  that  humans  are  liberally  en- 
dowed with intrinsic motivational tendencies, the evidence 
is now clear that the maintenance and enhancement of this 
inherent propensity requires supportive conditions, as it can 
be fairly readily disrupted by various nonsupportive con- 
ditions.  Thus,  our theory of intrinsic  motivation does not 
concern what causes intrinsic  motivation (which we view 
as  an  evolved  propensity;  Ryan  et  al.,  1997);  rather,  it 
examines the conditions that elicit and sustain, versus sub- 
due and diminish, this innate propensity. 
Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) was presented by 
Deci and Ryan (1985) as a subtheory within SDT that had 
the  aim  of  specifying  factors  that  explain  variability  in 
intrinsic motivation. CET is framed in terms of social and 
environmental factors that  facilitate versus undermine in- 
trinsic motivation, using language that reflects the assump- 
tion that intrinsic  motivation, being inherent,  will be cata- 
lyzed  when  individuals  are  in  conditions  that  conduce 
toward  its  expression.  In  other  words,  it  will  flourish  if 
circumstances permit. Put in this way, the study of condi- 
tions that facilitate versus undermine intrinsic motivation is 
an  important  first  step  in  understanding  sources  of both 
alienation  and liberation of the positive aspects of human 
nature. 
CET,  which  focuses  on  the  fundamental  needs  for 
competence  and  autonomy,  was  formulated  to  integrate 
results from initial laboratory experiments on the effects of 
rewards,  feedback,  and  other external  events  on  intrinsic 
motivation, and was subsequently tested and extended by 
field  studies  in  various  settings.  The  theory  argues,  first, 
that social-contextual events (e.g., feedback, communica- 
tions, rewards) that conduce toward feelings of competence 
during  action  can  enhance  intrinsic  motivation  for  that 
action.  Accordingly,  optimal  challenges,  effectance-pro- 
rooting feedback, and freedom from demeaning evaluations 
were all found to facilitate intrinsic motivation. For exam- 
ple,  early studies  showed that positive performance feed- 
back enhanced intrinsic motivation, whereas negative per- 
formance  feedback  diminished  it  (Deci,  1975),  and  re- 
search  by  Vallerand  and  Reid  (1984)  showed  that  these 
effects were mediated by perceived competence. 
CET further specifies, and studies have shown (Fisher, 
1978;  Ryan,  1982),  that  feelings  of competence  will  not 
enhance  intrinsic  motivation  unless  accompanied  by  a 
sense of autonomy or, in attributional terms, by an internal 
perceived locus of causality (deCharms,  1968).  Thus,  ac- 
cording to CET, people must not only experience compe- 
tence or efficacy, they must also experience their behavior 
as  self-determined  for  intrinsic  motivation  to  be  in  evi- 
dence.  This  requires  either  immediate  contextual  sup- 
ports  for autonomy and  competence or  abiding  inner  re- 
sources  (Reeve,  1996)  that are typically the result of prior 
developmental  supports  for  perceived  autonomy  and 
competence. 
In fact, most of the research on the effects of environ- 
mental  events  in  intrinsic  motivation has  focused on  the 
issue of autonomy versus control rather than that of com- 
petence. Research on this issue has been considerably more 
controversial. It began with the repeated demonstration that 
extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation. Deci 
(1975)  interpreted these results in terms of rewards facili- 
tating  a  more external  perceived  locus  of causality  (i.e., 
diminished  autonomy).  Although  the  issue  of reward  ef- 
fects  has  been  hotly  debated,  a  recent,  comprehensive 
meta-analysis (Deci,  Koestner,  &  Ryan,  1999)  confirmed, 
in  spite  of  claims  to  the  contrary  by  Eisenberger  and 
Cameron (1996),  that all expected tangible rewards made 
contingent on task performance do reliably undermine in- 
trinsic motivation. 
Also, research revealed that not only tangible rewards 
but  also  threats,  deadlines,  directives,  pressured  evalua- 
tions, and imposed goals diminish intrinsic motivation be- 
cause,  like tangible rewards,  they conduce  toward an ex- 
ternal  perceived  locus  of  causality.  In  contrast,  choice, 
acknowledgment  of  feelings,  and  opportunities  for  self- 
direction  were  found  to  enhance  intrinsic  motivation  be- 
cause  they  allow  people  a  greater  feeling  of  autonomy 
(Deci & Ryan,  1985). Field studies have further shown that 
70  January 2000 • American Psychologist teachers who are autonomy supportive (in contrast to con- 
trolling) catalyze in their students greater intrinsic motiva- 
tion, curiosity, and desire for challenge (e.g., Deci, Nezlek, 
&  Sheinman,  1981;  Flink,  Boggiano,  &  Barrett,  1990; 
Ryan  &  Grolnick,  1986).  Students  taught  with  a  more 
controlling approach not only lose initiative  but learn  less 
effectively,  especially  when  learning  requires  conceptual, 
creative  processing  (Amabile,  1996;  Grolnick  &  Ryan, 
1987; Utman,  1997).  Similarly, studies showed that auton- 
omy-supportive  parents,  relative  to  controlling  parents, 
have  children  who  are  more  intrinsically  motivated 
(Grolnick, Deci, &  Ryan, 1997). Such findings generalized 
to other domains such as sport and music in which supports 
for  autonomy  and  competence  by  parents  and  mentors 
incite  more intrinsic  motivation  (e.g.,  Frederick  &  Ryan, 
1995). 
Although  autonomy  and  competence  supports  are 
highly salient for producing variability in intrinsic motiva- 
tion, a third factor, relatedness, also bears on its expression. 
In  infancy,  intrinsic  motivation  is  readily  observable  as 
exploratory behavior and, as suggested by attachment the- 
orists  (e.g.,  Bowlby,  1979),  it  is  more  evident  when  the 
infant is  securely attached  to a parent.  Studies  of mothers 
and  infants  have,  indeed,  shown  that  both  security  and 
maternal  autonomy  support  predict  more  exploratory be- 
havior  in  the  infants  (e.g.,  Frodi,  Bridges,  &  Grolnick, 
1985).  SDT hypothesizes that a similar dynamic occurs in 
interpersonal  settings  over  the  life  span,  with  intrinsic 
motivation more likely to flourish in contexts characterized 
by a sense of security and relatedness. For example, Ander- 
son,  Manoogian,  and  Reznick  (1976)  found  that  when 
children worked on an interesting task in the presence of an 
adult stranger who ignored them  and failed  to respond to 
their  initiations,  a  very  low  level  of intrinsic  motivation 
resulted,  and  Ryan  and  Grolnick  (1986)  observed  lower 
intrinsic  motivation  in  students  who  experienced  their 
teachers as cold and uncaring. Of course, many intrinsically 
motivated  behaviors  are  happily  performed  in  isolation, 
suggesting  that  proximal  relational  supports  may  not  be 
necessary  for intrinsic  motivation,  but  a  secure  relational 
base  does  seem  to  be  important  for  the  expression  of 
intrinsic  motivation to be in evidence. 
To summarize,  the CET framework suggests that so- 
cial environments can facilitate  or forestall  intrinsic  moti- 
vation by supporting versus thwarting people's innate psy- 
chological needs. Strong links between intrinsic motivation 
and satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and competence 
have been clearly demonstrated,  and  some work suggests 
that  satisfaction  of the  need for relatedness,  at  least  in  a 
distal sense, may also be important for intrinsic motivation. 
It  is  critical  to  remember,  however,  that  people  will  be 
intrinsically motivated only for activities that hold intrinsic 
interest for them, activities that have the appeal of novelty, 
challenge, or aesthetic value. For activities that do not hold 
such appeal,  the principles  of CET do not apply, because 
the activities will not be experienced as intrinsically moti- 
vated to begin with. To understand the motivation for those 
activities, we need to look more deeply into the nature and 
dynamics of extrinsic  motivation. 
Self-Regulation of Extrinsic 
Motivation 
Although intrinsic  motivation is an important type of mo- 
tivation,  it  is  not  the  only type  or even  the  only type of 
self-determined  motivation (Deci  &  Ryan,  1985).  Indeed, 
much of what people do is not,  strictly  speaking,  intrinsi- 
cally motivated, especially after early childhood when the 
fi'eedom to be  intrinsically  motivated  is  increasingly  cur- 
tailed  by  social  pressures  to  do  activities  that  are  not 
interesting  and to assume a variety of new responsibilities 
(Ryan &  La Guardia,  in press). 
The  real  question  concerning  nonintrinsically  moti- 
vated practices is how individuals acquire the motivation to 
carry  them  out  and  how  this  motivation  affects  ongoing 
persistence,  behavioral quality, and well-being. Whenever 
a person (be it a parent,  teacher, boss, coach, or therapist) 
attempts  to foster certain  behaviors  in  others,  the  others' 
motivation for the behavior can range from amotivation or 
unwillingness,  to  passive  compliance,  to  active  personal 
commitment.  According to  SDT,  these  different  motiva- 
tions reflect differing degrees to which the value and reg- 
ulation  of the  requested  behavior  have  been  internalized 
and integrated. Internalization refers to people's "taking in" 
a  value or regulation,  and integration  refers to the further 
transformation  of that  regulation  into  their  own  so  that, 
subsequently,  it will  emanate  from their sense of self. 
Internalization  and  integration  are  clearly central  is- 
sues  in childhood socialization, but they are also continu- 
ally re]evant for the regulation of behavior across the life 
span. In nearly every setting people enter, certain behaviors 
and va]ues are prescribed, behaviors that are not interesting 
and  values  that  are  not  spontaneously  adopted.  Accord- 
ingly,  SDT  has  addressed  the  issues  of (a)  the  processes 
through  which  such  nonintrinsically  motivated  behaviors 
can  become  truly  self-determined,  and  (b)  the  ways  in 
which the social environment influences  those processes. 
The  lerm  extrinsic  motivation  refers  to  the  perfor- 
mance  of  an  activity  in  order  to  attain  some  separable 
outcome  and,  thus,  contrasts  with  intrinsic  motivation, 
which refers to doing an activity for the inherent  satisfac- 
tion  of the  activity  itself.  Unlike  some  perspectives  that 
view extrinsically  motivated behavior as  invariantly  non- 
autonomous,  SDT  proposes  that  extrinsic  motivation  can 
vary  greatly  in  its  relative  autonomy  (Ryan  &  Connell, 
1989; Vallerand,  1997). For example, students who do their 
homework because they personally grasp its value for their 
chosen career are extrinsically motivated, as are those who 
do the work only because they are adhering to their parents' 
control.  Both  examples  involve  instrumentalities  rather 
than  enjoyment of the  work itself,  yet the former case of 
extrinsic  motivation  entails  personal  endorsement  and  a 
feeling of choice,  whereas  the  latter  involves  compliance 
with an external  regulation.  Both represent  intentional be- 
havior  (Heider,  1958),  but  they vary in  their  relative  au- 
tonomy.  The  former,  of course,  is  the  type  of extrinsic 
motivation  that  is  sought  by  astute  socializing  agents  re- 
gardless  o1: the applied domain. 
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The Self-Determination Continuum Showing Types of Motivation  With Their Regulatory Styles, Loci of Causality, 
and Corresponding Processes 
Behavior  Nonself-Determined  Self-Determined 
Motivation 
StylesRegulat°ry  ~Regul~ 
E~ic  Mot~ 
Perceived 
Locus of 
Causality 
Impersonal  External  Somewhat  Somewhat  Intemal  Internal 
External  Internal 
Relevant  Nonintentional, 
Regulatory  Nonvaluing, 
Processes  Incompetence, 
Lack of Control 
Compliance,  Self-control,  Personal  Congruence,  Interest, 
External  Ego-Involvement, Importance,  Awareness,  Enjoyment, 
Rewards and  Internal Rewards  Conscious  Synthesis  Inherent 
Punishments  and Punishments  Valuing  With Self  Satisfaction 
Within  SDT,  Deci  and  Ryan  (1985)  introduced  a 
second  subtheory,  called  organismic  integration  theory 
(OIT), to detail the different forms of extrinsic motivation 
and  the  contextual  factors  that  either  promote  or  hinder 
internalization  and  integration  of the regulation  for these 
behaviors.  Figure  1 illustrates  the OIT taxonomy of moti- 
vational  types,  arranged from left to fight in terms  of the 
degree to which the motivations emanate from the self (i.e., 
are self-determined). 
At the far left of the self-determination  continuum is 
amotivation, the state of lacking the intention to act. When 
amotivated,  people  either  do not act at  all  or act without 
intent--they just go through the motions. Amotivation re- 
sults from not valuing an activity (Ryan, 1995), not feeling 
competent to do it (Bandura,  1986),  or not expecting it to 
yield a desired outcome (Seligman,  1975). To the right of 
amotivation in Figure 1 are five classifications of motivated 
behavior. Although many theorists have treated motivation 
as  a  unitary  concept,  each  of  the  categories  identified 
within  OIT  describes  theoretically,  experientially,  and 
functionally distinct types of motivation. At the far right of 
the  continuum  is  the classic  state  of intrinsic  motivation, 
the doing of an activity for its  inherent  satisfactions.  It is 
highly autonomous and represents  the prototypic instance 
of  self-determination.  Extrinsically  motivated  behaviors, 
by contrast, cover the continuum between amotivation and 
intrinsic  motivation,  varying  in  the  extent  to which  their 
regulation is  autonomous. 
The  extrinsically  motivated  behaviors  that  are  least 
autonomous  are  referred  to as  externally  regulated.  Such 
behaviors  are performed to satisfy  an external  demand or 
reward  contingency.  Individuals  typically experience  ex- 
ternally regulated behavior as controlled or alienated,  and 
their actions have an external perceived locus of causality 
(deCharms,  1968). External regulation is the type of moti- 
vation  focused  on  by  operant  theorists  (e.g.,  Skinner, 
1953), and it is external regulation that was typically con- 
trasted  with  intrinsic  motivation  in  early  laboratory  and 
field  studies. 
A  second type of extrinsic  motivation  is  labeled  in- 
trojected  regulation.  Introjection involves taking in a reg- 
ulation  but  not  fully  accepting  it  as  one's  own.  It  is  a 
relatively controlled form of regulation in which behaviors 
are  performed  to  avoid  guilt  or  anxiety  or to  attain  ego 
enhancements  such  as  pride.  Put  differently,  introjection 
represents  regulation  by  contingent  self-esteem  (Deci  & 
Ryan,  1995). A  classic form of introjection is ego involve- 
ment  (deCharms,  1968;  Nicholls,  1984;  Ryan,  1982),  in 
which people are motivated to demonstrate ability (or avoid 
failure)  in  order  to maintain  feelings  of worth.  Although 
internally driven, introjected behaviors still have an exter- 
nal perceived locus of causality and are not really experi- 
enced  as  part  of the  self.  Thus,  in  some studies,  external 
regulation  (being  interpersonally  controlled)  and  in- 
trojected regulation (being intrapersonally controlled) have 
been combined to form a controlled motivation composite 
(e.g., Williams,  Grow, Freedman,  Ryan, &  Deci,  1996). 
A  more autonomous, or self-determined,  form of ex- 
trinsic  motivation  is  regulation  through  identification. 
Identification reflects  a  conscious valuing of a  behavioral 
goal  or  regulation,  such  that  the  action  is  accepted  or 
owned as personally  important.  Finally,  the most autono- 
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Integration  occurs  when  identified  regulations  are  fully 
assimilated to the self,  which means they have been eval- 
uated and brought into congruence with one's other values 
and needs. Actions characterized by integrated motivation 
share  many qualities  with  intrinsic  motivation,  although 
they are still considered extrinsic because they are done to 
attain  separable  outcomes  rather  than  for  their  inherent 
enjoyment. In some studies,  identified,  integrated,  and in- 
trinsic forms of regulation have been combined to form an 
autonomous motivation composite. 
As people internalize regulations and assimilate them 
to  the  self,  they  experience  greater  autonomy in  action. 
This process may occur in stages, over time, but we are not 
suggesting  that  it  is  a  developmental  continuum  in  the 
sense  that  people  must  progress  through  each  stage  of 
internalization  with  respect  to  a  particular  regulation. 
Rather, they can relatively readily internalize a new behav- 
ioral  regulation at any point along this  continuum depend- 
ing on both prior experiences and current situational factors 
(Ryan, 1995). Nonetheless, the range of behaviors that can 
be assimilated to the self increases over time with increased 
cognitive  capacities  and  ego  development  (Loevinger & 
Blasi,  1991),  and there is evidence that children's general 
regulatory style does tend to become more internalized or 
self-regulated over time (e.g.,  Chandler & Connell,  1987). 
Ryan and Connell (1989) tested the formulation that 
these different types of motivation, with their distinct prop- 
erties,  lie  along a  continuum of relative  autonomy. They 
investigated achievement behaviors among school children 
and found that external, introjected, identified,  and intrinsic 
regulatory styles were intercorrelated according to a quasi- 
simplex pattern, thus providing evidence for an underlying 
continuum. Furthermore, differences in the type of extrin- 
sic  motivation were  associated with different experiences 
and outcomes. For example, the more students were exter- 
nally regulated  the  less  they  showed interest,  value,  and 
effort  toward  achievement  and  the  more  they  tended  to 
disown responsibility for negative outcomes, blaming oth- 
ers  such  as  the  teacher.  Introjected  regulation  was  posi- 
tively  related  to  expending  more  effort,  but  it  was  also 
related  to  feeling  more  anxiety  and  coping  more poorly 
with failures. In contrast, identified regulation was associ- 
ated with more interest and enjoyment of school and with 
more  positive  coping  styles,  as  well  as  with  expending 
more effort. 
Other  studies  in  education  extended  these  findings, 
showing that  more autonomous extrinsic  motivation was 
associated  with  more engagement  (Connell  &  Wellborn, 
1991),  better  performance  (Miserandino,  1996),  lower 
dropout  (Vallerand  &  Bissonnette,  1992),  higher quality 
learning (Grolnick &  Ryan,  1987),  and better teacher rat- 
ings (Hayamizu, 1997),  among other outcomes. 
In the realm of health care, greater internalization has 
been  associated  with  greater  adherence  to  medications 
among  people  with  chronic  illnesses  (Williams,  Rodin, 
Ryan, Grolnick,  &  Deci,  1998),  better  long-term mainte- 
nance of weight loss among morbidly obese patients (Wil- 
liams et al.,  1996),  improved glucose control among dia- 
betics  (Williams,  Freedman,  &  Deci,  1998),  and  greater 
attendance and involvement in an addiction-treatment pro- 
gram (Ryan, Plant,  & O'Malley,  1995). 
Demonstrations of positive outcomes being associated 
with  more  internalized  motivation  have  also  emerged  in 
other diverse domains, including religion (Ryan, Rigby, & 
King,  1993),  physical exercise  (Chatzisarantis,  Biddle,  & 
Meek,  1997),  political  activity (Koestner,  Losier,  Valler- 
and,  &  Carducci,  1996),  environmental  activism (Green- 
Demers, Pelletier,  & Menard,  1997), and intimate relation- 
ships  (Blais,  Sabourin,  Boucher,  &  Vallerand,  1990), 
among others. 
The advantages of greater internalization appear, then, 
to be manifold (Ryan et al.,  1997),  including more behav- 
ioral effectiveness, greater volitional persistence, enhanced 
subjective well-being, and  better assimilation of the indi- 
vidual within his or her social group. 
Facilitating Integration of Extrinsic 
Motivation 
Given the significance of internalization for personal expe- 
rience and behavioral outcomes, the critical issue becomes 
how  to  promote  autonomous  regulation  for extrinsically 
motiwtted behaviors. That is, what are the social conditions 
that nurture versus inhibit internalization and integration? 
Because extrinsically motivated behaviors are not typ- 
ically interesting,  the  primary reason people initially per- 
form such actions is because the behaviors are prompted, 
modeled, or valued by significant others to whom they feel 
(or  want  to  feel)  attached  or  related.  This  suggests  that 
relatedness,  the need to feel belongingess and connected- 
ness with others, is centrally important for internalization. 
Thus, OIT proposes that internalization is more likely to be 
in evidence when there are ambient supports for feelings of 
relatedness.  For example, Ryan, Stiller,  and Lynch (1994) 
showed that the children who had more fully internalized 
the  regulation  for positive  school-related behaviors  were 
those who felt securely connected to, and cared for by, their 
parents  and teachers. 
The relative internalization of extrinsically motivated 
activities is also a function of perceived competence. Peo- 
ple are  more likely to adopt activities  that relevant social 
groups  value  when  they  feel  efficacious  with  respect  to 
those activities.  As is  the case with all  intentional  action, 
OIT suggests that supports for competence should facilitate 
intermdization (Vallerand,  1997).  Thus, for example, chil- 
dren who are directed to perform behaviors before they are 
developmentally ready to master them or understand their 
rationale  would  be  predicted,  at  best,  only  to  partially 
intern~tlize the regulations, remaining either externally reg- 
ulated or introjected. 
Finally, the experience of autonomy facilitates  inter- 
nalization  and,  in  particular,  is  a  critical  element  for  a 
regulation  to  be  integrated.  Contexts  can  yield  external 
regulation  if there  are  salient  rewards  or threats  and  the 
person  feels  competent  enough to  comply; contexts  can 
yield introjected  regulation  if a  relevant  reference  group 
endorses the  activity and the person feels  competent and 
related; but contexts can yield autonomous regulation only 
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to feel competent, related, and autonomous. To integrate a 
regulation,  people must grasp its  meaning and synthesize 
that meaning with respect to their other goals and values. 
Such deep, holistic processing (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) is 
facilitated by a sense of choice, volition, and freedom from 
excessive external  pressure toward behaving or thinking a 
certain  way.  In  this  sense,  support  lor  autonomy allows 
individuals to actively transform values into their own. 
Again, research results have supported this reasoning. 
For  example,  Deci,  Eghrari,  Patrick,  and  Leone  (1994) 
demonstrated  in  a  laboratory experiment that providing a 
meaningful rationale  for an  uninteresting  behavior,  along 
with  supports  for  autonomy  and  relatedness,  promoted 
its  internalization  and  integration.  Controlling  contexts 
yielded less overall internalization,  and the internalization 
that  did  occur  in  those  contexts  tended  to  be  only  in- 
trojected.  Using  parent  interviews,  Grolnick  and  Ryan 
(1989) found greater internalization of school-related val- 
ues among children whose parents were more supportive of 
autonomy  and  relatedness.  Strahan  (1995)  found  that 
parents  who  were  more  autonomy-supportive  promoted 
greater religious identification, as  opposed to introjection, 
in their offspring. Williams and Deci (1996),  using a lon- 
gitudinal  design,  demonstrated  greater  internalization  of 
biopsychosocial values  and practices among medical stu- 
dents  whose instructors  were  more autonomy-supportive. 
These are but a few of the many findings suggesting that 
supports for relatedness and competence facilitate internal- 
ization and that supports for autonomy also facilitate inte- 
gration of behavioral regulations. When that occurs, people 
feel not only competent and related but also autonomous as 
they carry out culturally valued activities. 
One  further  point  needs  to  be  made  regarding  the 
controversial  issue  of human  autonomy.  The  concept of 
autonomy has often been portrayed as being antagonistic to 
relatedness  or  community,  in  fact,  some  theories  equate 
autonomy with  concepts  such  as  individualism  and  inde- 
pendence  (e.g.,  Steinberg  &  Silverberg,  1986),  which do 
indeed imply low relatedness.  But, within SDT, autonomy 
refers  not  to  being  independent,  detached,  or  selfish  but 
rather to the feeling of volition that can accompany any act, 
whether dependent or independent, collectivist or individ- 
ualist,  in fact, recent research in Korean and U.S. samples 
has found a more positive relation between autonomy and 
collectivistic attitudes than between autonomy and individ- 
ualistic  attitudes  (Kim,  Butzel,  &  Ryan,  1998).  Further- 
more,  research  has  shown  positive,  rather  than  negative, 
links between relatedness to parents and autonomy in teen- 
agers (Ryan &  Lynch,  1989;  Ryan et al.,  1994).  Clearly, 
then,  we  do  not  equate  autonomy with  independence  or 
individualism. 
Alienation  and Its Prevention 
SDT aims to specify factors that nurture the innate human 
potentials  entailed  in growth, integration,  and well-being, 
and to explore the processes and conditions that foster the 
healthy development and effective functioning of individ- 
uals,  groups,  and  communities.  But  a  positive  approach 
cannot ignore patholog2( or close its eyes to the alienation 
and inauthenticity that are prevalent in our society and in 
others. Accordingly, we investigate nonoptimal (as well as 
optimal) developmental trajectories, much as is done in the 
field  of developmental  psychopathology (e.g.,  Cicchetti, 
1991).  We now turn to a brief consideration of that issue. 
By  definition,  intrinsically  motivated  behaviors,  the 
prototype of self-determined  actions,  stem  from the  self. 
They are unalienated and authentic in the fullest sense of 
those  terms.  But,  as  already  noted,  SDT  recognizes that 
extrinsically motivated actions can also become self-deter- 
mined as individuals identify with and fully assimilate their 
regulation. Thus,  it is  through internalization and integra- 
tion that individuals can be extrinsically motivated and still 
be  committed  and  authentic.  Accumulated research  now 
suggests that the commitment and authenticity reflected in 
intrinsic motivation and integrated extrinsic motivation are 
most  likely  to  be  evident  when  individuals  experience 
supports for competence, autonomy, and relatedness. 
It is  the  flip  side  of this  coin,  however, that  speaks 
directly to the issues of alienation and inauthenticity and is 
relevant  to  such  questions  as  why  employees  show  no 
initiative,  why teenagers  reject their  schools'  values,  and 
why patients  adhere  so poorly to treatment.  SDT under- 
stands  such  occurrences  in  terms  of the  undermining  of 
intrinsic motivation and, perhaps even more typically, the 
failure  of internalization.  To  explain  the  causes  of such 
diminished functioning, SDT suggests turning first to indi- 
viduals' immediate social contexts and then to their devel- 
opmental  environments  to  examine  the  degree  to  which 
their needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness are 
being or have been thwarted. We maintain that by failing to 
provide supports for competence, autonomy, and related- 
ness, not only of children but also of students, employees, 
patients,  and athletes,  socializing agents and organizations 
contribute to alienation and ill-being. The fact that psycho- 
logical-need deprivation appears to be a principal source of 
human distress suggests that assessments and interventions 
would do well to target these primary foundations of men- 
tal health. 
Psychologic.a! Needs and 
Mental  Health 
As we have seen,  both the cognitive evaluation and organ- 
ismic integration components of SDT have led us to posit 
a parsimonious list of three basic psychological needs as a 
means of organizing and interpreting a wide array of em- 
pirical  results,  results  that  seemed not to  be  readily  and 
satisfactorily  interpretable  without  the  concept of needs. 
Much  of our  more  recent  work has  used  the  concept of 
three basic psychological needs to address new phenomena 
and,  more particularly, to evaluate the postulate that these 
three needs are innate, essential,  and universal. 
By our definition, a basic need, whether it be a phys- 
iological need (Hull,  1943)  or a psychological need, is  an 
energizing state  that,  if satisfied,  conduces toward health 
and well-being but, if not satisfied,  contributes to pathology 
and ill-being.  We have thus proposed that the basic needs 
for competence, autonomy, and relatedness  must be satis- 
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ongoing sense of integrity and well-being or "eudaimonia" 
(Ryan & Frederick,  1997;  Waterman,  1993). Accordingly, 
much  of our  research  now  focuses  on  the  link  between 
satisfaction of the basic psychological needs and the expe- 
rience of well-being. 
Specifying  psychological  needs  as  essential  nutri- 
ments implies that individuals cannot thrive without satis- 
fying all  of them,  any more than  people can thrive with 
water but  not  food.  Thus,  for example, a  social environ- 
ment that affords competence but fails to nurture related- 
ness is expected to result in some impoverishment of well- 
being.  Worse  yet,  social  contexts  that  engender conflicts 
between basic needs set up the conditions for alienation and 
psychopathology (Ryan et  al.,  1995),  as  when  a  child  is 
required by parents  to give up autonomy in order to feel 
loved. 
To  suggest  that  the  three  needs  are  universal  and 
developmentally persistent does not  imply that their rela- 
tive salience and their avenues for satisfaction are unchang- 
ing across the life span or that their modes of expression are 
the same in all cultures. The very fact that need satisfaction 
is facilitated by the internalization  and integration of cul- 
turally  endorsed  values  and  behaviors  suggests  that  indi- 
viduals are likely to express their competence, autonomy, 
and relatedness differently within cultures that hold differ- 
ent values. Indeed, the mode and degree of people's psy- 
chological-need  satisfaction  is  theorized  to  be  influenced 
not only by their own competencies but, even more impor- 
tant, by the ambient demands, obstacles, and affordances in 
their sociocultural contexts.  Thus,  to posit universal psy- 
chological needs does not diminish the importance of vari- 
ability in goals and orientations at different developmental 
epochs or in different cultures, but it does suggest similar- 
ities in underlying processes that lead to the development 
and expression of those differences. 
Our recent investigations  of the  importance of basic 
psychological needs  have  addressed  three  questions:  Are 
the pursuit and attainment of all culturally congruent aspi- 
rations  and  life  values  associated  with  well-being?  Do 
need-related  processes  operate  similarly  within  different 
cultural circumstances? Is within-person variability in basic 
need  satisfaction related to variability in well-being indi- 
cators? We briefly consider some of this work. 
First,  we  discuss  the  relation  of  personal  goals  to 
well-being.  We  have  hypothesized  that  the  pursuit  and 
attainment of some life goals will provide relatively direct 
satisfaction of the basic needs, thus  enhancing well-being 
(Ryan, Sheldon,  Kasser, &  Deci,  1996),  whereas the pur- 
suit and attainment of other goals does not contribute to and 
may even detract from basic need satisfactions, leading to 
ill-being. In accord with this reasoning, T. Kasser and Ryan 
(1993,  1996)  examined individual  differences in  the  em- 
phasis people place on intrinsic aspirations (goals such as 
affiliation,  personal  growth,  and  community that  directly 
satisfy  basic  needs)  compared  with  extrinsic  aspirations 
(goals such as wealth,  fame, and image that  at best indi- 
rectly  satisfy  the  needs).  They  found,  first,  that  placing 
strong relative importance on intrinsic aspirations was pos- 
itively associated with well-being indicators  such as self- 
esteem,  self-actualization,  and  the  inverse  of depression 
and anxiety, whereas placing strong relative importance on 
extrinsic  aspirations  was  negatively  related  to  these 
well-being  indicators.  Ryan,  Chirkov,  Little,  Sheldon, 
Timoshina, and Deci (1999) replicated these findings in a 
Russian  sample, attesting to the potential generalizability 
of the findings across cultures. 
These  findings  go  beyond  goal  importance  per  se. 
Both  Ryan,  Chirkov,  et  al.  and  T.  Kasser and  Ryan  (in 
press) have found that whereas self-reported attainment of 
intrinsic  aspirations  was  positively associated  with  well- 
being, attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. Further, 
Sheldon  and  Kasser (1998)  found in  a  longitudinal  study 
that  well-being  was  enhanced  by  attainment  of intrinsic 
goals,  'whereas  success  at  extrinsic  goals  provided  little 
benefit.  Together,  these  results  suggest  that  even  highly 
efficacious people may experience less than optimal well- 
being if they pursue and successfully attain goals that do 
not  fulfill  basic  psychological  needs.  We  hasten  to  add, 
however,  that  the  meaning of specific goals  is  culturally 
influenced,  so that how specific goals relate to well-being 
can  vary  across  cultures,  although  the  relation  between 
underlying need satisfaction and well-being is theorized to 
be invariant. 
Clearly,  there  are  many  factors  that  lead  people  to 
emphasize certain life goals that may not be need fulfilling. 
For  example,  exposure  to  the  commercial  media  can 
prompt  a  locus  on  materialism  (Richins,  1987),  which 
provides only fleeting satisfactions and could actually de- 
tract  from  basic  need  fulfillment  and,  thus,  well-being. 
Prior deficits in need fulfillment (e.g., from poor caregiv- 
ing) might also lead individuals to yearn for more extrinsic 
goals as a substitute or compensatory mechanism. In fact, 
T. Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff (1995) found that teens 
who had been exposed to cold,  controlling  maternal care 
(as assessed with ratings by the teens, mothers, and observ- 
ers) were more likely to develop materialistic orientations, 
compared  with  better  nurtured  teens  who  more  strongly 
valued the intrinsic goals of personal growth, relationships, 
and  community. In  short,  cultural  and  developmental in- 
fluences produce variations in the importance of goals, the 
pursuit  of which,  in  turn,  yields  different  satisfaction  of 
basic needs and different levels of well-being. 
In other research, we have examined the relations of 
people's reports of need satisfaction to indicators of well- 
being in various settings. For example, V. Kasser and Ryan 
(in press) found that supports for autonomy and relatedness 
predicted  greater  well-being  among  nursing  home  resi- 
dents. Baard, Deci, and Ryan (1998) showed that employ- 
ees' experiences of satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, 
competence,  and  relatedness  in  the  workplace  predicted 
their performance and  well-being  at work.  Such research 
shows that within specific domains, especially those central 
to the  lives of individuals,  need  satisfaction is correlated 
with improved well-being. 
A more compelling way of demonstrating the essential 
relations between need fulfillments and mental health has 
been the examination of role-to-role and day-to-day fluc- 
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variability in  well-being, while controlling for individual 
differences and various confounding variables. For exam- 
ple, Sheldon et al. (1997) demonstrated that satisfaction in 
each of several life roles (e.g., student, employee, friend), 
relative  to  the  individual's  own  mean  satisfaction,  was 
attributable to the  degree to  which  that  role  supports  au- 
thenticity  and  autonomous  functioning.  Similarly,  in  a 
study that  examined daily variations in well-being, Shel- 
don, Reis, and Ryan (1996)  used hierarchical linear mod- 
eling to  show  that within-person daily fluctuations in the 
satisfaction of autonomy and competence needs predicted 
within-person fluctuations in outcomes  such as mood, vi- 
tality, physical symptoms, and  self-esteem. In a  more re- 
cent  study,  Reis,  Sheldon,  Gable,  Roscoe,  and  Ryan  (in 
press) found that variations in the fulfillment of each of the 
three needs  (i.e., competence, autonomy,  and relatedness) 
independently  predicted  variability  in  daily  well-being. 
These  studies  support  the  view  that  basic  psychological 
needs are determinative with regard to optimal experience 
and well-being in daily life. 
Conclusions 
Debates concerning the activity or passivity, responsibility 
or indolence, of human beings have been perennial (Kohn, 
1990). As psychology has become more advanced, both in 
terms of our understanding of evolution and neurobiology 
and of social behavior and its causation, ample support for 
both  perspectives could be  garnered.  SDT  addresses this 
issue by attempting to account for both the activity and the 
passivity, the responsibility and the indolence. To do this, 
we have assumed that humans have an inclination toward 
activity and  integration,  but  also  have  a  vulnerability to 
passivity. Our focus, accordingly, has been to specify the 
conditions  that  tend  to  support  people's  natural  activity 
versus elicit or exploit their vulnerability. 
Our early investigations focused on the social condi- 
tions that enhance  versus diminish a  very positive feature 
of human nature, namely, the natural activity and curiosity 
referred  to  as  intrinsic motivation.  We  found  that  condi- 
tions supportive of autonomy and competence reliably fa- 
cilitated this  vital  expression  of  the  human  growth  ten- 
dency,  whereas  conditions  that  controlled  behavior  and 
hindered perceived effectance undermined  its expression. 
Subsequently, we investigated the acquisition and regula- 
tion of nonintrinsically motivated behaviors and, here too, 
we found evidence of the dramatic power of social contexts 
to enhance or hinder the organismic tendency to integrate 
ambient  social  values  and  responsibilities. Contexts  sup- 
portive  of  autonomy,  competence,  and  relatedness  were 
found to foster greater internalization and integration than 
contexts that thwart satisfaction of these needs. This latter 
finding,  we  argue,  is of great significance for individuals 
who  wish  to  motivate  others  in  a  way  that  engenders 
commitment, effort, and high-quality performance. 
Yet, our primary concern throughout this program of 
research  has  been  the  well-being of individuals, whether 
they are students in classrooms, patients in clinics, athletes 
on  the  playing field, or employees in  the  workplace.  As 
formulated by  SDT,  if the  social contexts  in  which  such 
individuals are embedded are responsive to basic psycho- 
logical needs, they provide the appropriate developmental 
lattice upon  which  an  active, assimilative, and  integrated 
nature  can  ascend.  Excessive  control,  nonoptimal  chal- 
lenges,  and  lack  of  connectedness,  on  the  other  hand, 
disrupt the inherent actualizing and organizational tenden- 
cies  endowed by nature,  and  thus  such  factors result not 
only in the lack of initiative and responsibility but also in 
distress and psychopathology. 
Knowledge  concerning  the  nutriments  essential  for 
positive  motivation  and  experience  and,  in  turn,  for  en- 
hanced performance and well-being has broad significance. 
It  is  relevant  to  parents  and  educators  concerned  with 
cognitive and personality development because it speaks to 
the conditions that promote the assimilation of both infor- 
mation  and  behavioral  regulations.  It  is  also  relevant  to 
managers  who  want  to  facilitate motivation  and  commit- 
ment on the job, and it is relevant to psychotherapists and 
health professionals because motivation is perhaps the crit- 
ical  variable  in  producing  maintained  change.  Thus,  by 
attending to the relative presence or deprivation of supports 
for basic psychological needs, practitioners are better able 
to  diagnose  sources  of  alienation  versus  engagement, 
and  facilitate  both  enhanced  human  achievements  and 
well-being. 
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